In reviewing different security risk assessment methods, we developed a tree-based security assessment model based on vulnerability reports. Using an attack tree in a unix login account as an example, we analyzed attack trees, resulting in experimental indication that the attacktree-based risk assessment is more efficient than direct security risk assessment.
Introduction
As information systems become more and more accessible, their confidentiality, integrity, and availability become very important concerns. With the popularity of the Internet, computer hackers not only attack information systems locally, but also remotely. Hackers explore vulnerabilities of information systems and illegally access electronic resources.
Many factors affect security risk in information systems, and current trends impact information security. Recent techniques for risk prevention include complex systems, pervasive Internet access systems, and extensible software systems. But these are not without weaknesses: complex systems are easy to carry with more flawed codes than smaller systems; pervasive Internet access makes software systems more vulnerable; and extensible software systems are susceptible to the introduction of new vulnerabilities.
Although updated security risk assessment methods have been proposed, most do not address needs and expectations for deciding a mitigation plan and allocating the related resources from management. Consequently, the business process for information technology is switching from information security management to a goal-oriented approach. The proposed method assesses information and serves the needs of many layers of management.
Information security implementations consist of bottom-up and top-down approaches. In the bottom-up approach, system administrators attempt to improve their system security. The advantage here is technical expertise of individual administrators, but it seldom works because it lacks participant support, specifically from top-level leaders, and staying power. In the top-down approach, the security practice is initiated by upper management, making implementation easily successful.
The typical organizational structure of leadership within information security implementation is as follows:
-Chief financial officer (CFO) -Chief information officer (CIO)  Chief information security officer (CISO)  Vice president of networks (VP-networks)  Vice president of systems (VP-systems) -Security managers -Network managers -System managers  Security administrators  System administrators  Network administrators
The CIO is responsible for advising senior executives on strategic planning; the CISO is responsible for assessment, management, and implementation of information systems in the organization and usually reports to the chief information officer.
Many cyberattacks have been reported recently; they stem from hackers using software bugs, denial of service, buffer overflows, SQL injections, TCP hijacking, and many other techniques [4] . As information security becomes increasingly important, many intrusion detection systems and intrusion prevention systems are developed and studied, but hackers exploit vulnerabilities in these information systems (i.e., open ports). To model different risk approaches, information security risk is assessed using attack graphs [5] . We derived an attack tree based on a vulnerability analysis and developed an information security risk assessment using the attack tree.
2.Tree-based Security Assessment Model

Vulnerability Analysis
Vulnerability analysis is a series of actions that defines, identifies, and classifies security holes (vulnerabilities) in computers, networks, and communication infrastructures [12] . In addition, vulnerability analysis can forecast and evaluate the effectiveness of proposed countermeasures. Vulnerability analysis consists of several actions:
1. Defining and classifying resources 2. Assigning relative levels of importance to the resources 3. Identifying potential threats to all resources 4. Classifying a priority to deal with the most serious potential problem first 5. Defining and implementing methods to minimize the consequences if an attack occurs If security holes are discovered, a vulnerability disclosure may be required and may be completed by the person who discovered the vulnerability. If the vulnerability is not categorized as a high-level threat, the vendor may be given a fair amount of time to fix the problem before the vulnerability is disclosed publicly.
Attack Trees
Tree-based modeling structures are used in the form of fault trees. The fault tree model is a formal method popularly used in evaluating system reliability [3] . Fault trees can be very effectively applied for security system analysis. Analysts use fault trees to analyze various reasons for security incident responses, find failure of systems, and identify complex failure modes. Fault trees can also find possible attack paths and attack targets. Traditional fault tree analysis is in different objective analysis within the systems.
Attack trees are extended fault trees and can model external security threats to the targeted system. In the tree, a root node is targeted by hackers to access. They get a lower layer of access first using a general approach and then they explore different upper layers for resource access. Moore et al. [6] discuss recursive or incremental access of an attack tree. The attack tree can describe attack processes and attack paths. Dawkins et al. define an attack plan and classify attack levels in the network. Clark et al. [2] present multi-step attack modeling in attack trees and analyze cut sets of the attack tree. Ray and Poolsapassit [9] present an attack tree expansion structure and a minimal attack tree to reduce the deficiencies in traditional attack trees.
Attack tree models have several advantages: they can be applied for quantitative analysis, specifically to compute the arrival probability to the target; and they can be built upon expert opinions. However, an attack tree cannot depict cycle events and may not be suitable for large-scale networks in different environments.
Enterprise Modeling
In previous studies, integrated business perspectives have been applied to security assessments [1] , [3] , and computer-based models and methods have been used for risk assessment [5] . In the identification of enterprise goals, the process is neither explained nor analyzed in some studies. The integrated solution for practitioners is unclear. Combined enterprise objectives within the identification of critical assets make sure that intangible assets are taken into consideration with the tangible ones. Tangible assets include database and other servers; intangible assets are brand names, intellectual property, etc.
3.Assessment Model Using Attack Tree
We first define enterprise objectives and resource definitions and then identify information assets. Then, we build an attack tree based on vulnerability analysis and conduct an analysis of the attack trees [4] . Install keyboard sniffer Obtain sniffer output file
Enterprise Objectives and Resources
An assessment team consists of a group of business branches, which are related to the success or failure of an enterprise achievement. Enterprise objectives are defined by different management teams. Goal and objective definitions are available in corporate policy documents and are the result of separate studies from organizations with staff participations. For small-to medium-sized enterprise organizations, goals and objectives are identified within the process. In this case, top management teams provide an array of objectives. A team is composed of members from top management and from the functional departments within organizations. Teams come up with a list of enterprise resources like intangible resources (i.e., brand name) and financial, physical, human, and knowledge capital (patents, process). A team comes from different backgrounds.
One challenge is identifying resources. Managers from stakeholder departments and executive management teams can ensure functionality on a team. They also maintain efficiency in identifying resources with various approaches.
Resource identification comprises stakeholders and project managers from different levels.
Resource Asset Identification
A team is built from the members of functional departments and the members of the information technology team within the organization. This team is an enlarged group of the previous one, but with more members in information technology. Ongoing management involvement in the process is essential for success. Teams discover the information assets required for proper functionality. In the enterprise organization, information technology assets are crucial to this step, which is why information technology members with various backgrounds are present in this stage.
Asset identification plays a significant role in the organization's capability to correlate different sets of information about assets. Specifications provide the important constructs to identify assets based on known knowledge and outline the purpose of asset identification, a data model for identifying assets, new ways for identifying assets, and guidance on how to use asset differentiations.
Some works have concentrated on identifying information system assets. Information system assets are classified into three categories: technology assets, human assets, and relationship assets. Technology assets cover physical information technology assets, including hardware, software, database, architecture, networks, technical platform, protocols, and standards. Human assets include stakeholder interactions, business understanding, technical skills, innovation skills, and problem-solving capacity. Relationship assets include partnerships and client relationships [11] . Information technology processes are categorized as assets because of cost-effective operations and support, planning ability, and fast delivery. Any impact factors to the above assets and processes must be taken into consideration.
Creation of Attack Tree
For security assessments, it is essential to develop an attack tree for testing progress. Research identifies weak systems and potential vulnerabilities. An attack tree should be developed and regularly updated. This is very important during security risk analysis phases.
In previous sections, we discussed enterprise objects, enterprise resources identification, and information asset identification phases. In general, an attack tree is built upon the enterprise objectives and enterprise resources in the form of assets, processes, and confidential information. In a typical attack tree, enterprise objectives are the root nodes. Related assets are the branch nodes of the tree. In each branch, there is one vulnerability in each node. An example of an attack tree in a Unix account is presented. In the root, there is a login Unix account. "Find written password" is one branch in the attack tree. The attack tree is illustrated in Figure 1 [10] .
Analysis of Attack Trees
In the analysis of attack trees, different measurements are conducted by checking possible attacks, the cost involved, and the priority of different vulnerability exposures. Different computations can be carried out in the attack tree using different values within the tree nodes. The success probability for the attacker against a specific node in the tree requires certain resources and costs. Analysis starts from high-level enterprise objectives and then moves to individual vulnerabilities and threat identifications in the branches (Figure 2 
Results
Isolated Lab Testing to Validate Attack Tree
The accuracy of vulnerability analysis and exploitation is greater when a replicated environment is set up in an isolated lab. Systems may be configured with specific control conditions. By designing a lab, we can reliably identify and exploit the vulnerabilities attempted against desired targets in the updated attack tree.
Security Risk Assessment Test
In order to test the effectiveness of the proposed method, we conducted experiments. The proposed approach is applicable for small and medium networks; it is manageable for large enterprise networks.
In the following, we compare the results from direct implementation and security risk assessment approaches. Multiple assessment teams (five teams with three people each) conducted security risk assessment with and without the proposed methods. The timing results of the experiments were recorded for statistical analysis. The assessment time difference is tested by a statistical method of T test (t = 6.7 > 4.032, where t 0.05 = 4.032). Results indicate that time for security risk assessment is significantly shorter than direct assessments.
Conclusion
We developed a security risk assessment model with significant achievements. The model accuracy and validation need to be improved because subject factors can result in uncertain consequences. For large-scale networks, several factors impact security. If we model all network security states, the model scale becomes large and difficult to fulfill a vulnerability assessment. In the assessment model, it is still a challenge to quantify all vulnerability factors. The different vulnerability factors may still have an impact on security assessment confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
